Cuando los derechos y libertades personales de un individuo o de un grupo de individuos entran en conflicto con los de otro, esos intereses deben sopesarse para determinar cuál debe prevalecer. El equilibrio entre la libertad religiosa y la no discriminación en el empleo está siendo actualmente reexaminado y refinado por los tribunales federales y las cuestiones son, en una palabra, complicadas.
Han circulado informaciones inexactas y engañosas sobre una reciente propuesta de la Oficina de Programas de Cumplimiento de Contratos Federales (OFCCP) del Departamento de Trabajo relativa a las revisiones de la normativa de la agencia por la que se aplica la Orden Ejecutiva (O.E.) 11246, concretamente la exención religiosa de la Cláusula de Igualdad de Oportunidades para los contratistas federales. Aquí pretendemos dejarnos de hipérboles y ofrecer una visión objetiva de lo que contienen (y lo que no contienen) las revisiones propuestas por la OFCCP, y lo que dichas revisiones podrían significar (y lo que no) para los empleadores y empleados de contratistas federales.
La Cláusula de Igualdad de Oportunidades en cuestión, codificada en 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.4, prohíbe a los empleadores de contratistas federales titulares de contratos federales admisibles discriminar a los empleados o solicitantes de empleo por motivos de raza, color, religión, sexo, orientación sexual, identidad de género u origen nacional. Esta disposición es casi idéntica al mandato de no discriminación que figura en el Título VII de la Ley de Derechos Civiles de 1964, en su versión modificada. Como veremos, la diferencia clave es que el Título VII no incluye explícitamente la orientación sexual o la identidad de género como clases protegidas.
Desde su creación, el Título VII permitía a los "empleadores religiosos" tener en cuenta la religión en el caso de los empleados que realizaran "actividades religiosas", a pesar de la prohibición de tener en cuenta la religión a la hora de tomar decisiones laborales. En otras palabras, en determinadas circunstancias, el interés de libertad religiosa de una "organización religiosa" debe prevalecer sobre el interés del individuo en la no discriminación por motivos de religión.
La Comisión para la Igualdad de Oportunidades en el Empleo (EEOC), el organismo federal independiente encargado de hacer cumplir la Ley de Derechos Civiles, articula dos "tipos" de exención religiosa: la exención de "organización religiosa" y la exención "ministerial".
En virtud de la exención de organización religiosa, las instituciones cuyo "propósito y carácter son principalmente religiosos" pueden dar preferencia en el empleo a los miembros de su propia religión. En este caso, el ámbito de aplicación de la exención es más amplio, ya que se aplica a todos los puestos, pero su aplicación sigue siendo limitada, ya que se limita a las "organizaciones religiosas".
Por ejemplo, los tribunales federales consideraron que la exención de organización religiosa no se aplicaba a un fabricante de equipos de minería que operaba con ánimo de lucro y no estaba afiliado a ninguna iglesia ni contaba con su apoyo, a pesar de que la empresa defendía abiertamente la doctrina religiosa, entre otras cosas, adjuntando tratados evangélicos en el correo de salida, imprimiendo versículos de la Biblia en sus documentos comerciales, apoyando económicamente a organizaciones religiosas y celebrando un servicio devocional semanal. EEOC v. Townley Eng. & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 618 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989).
En cambio, los tribunales federales consideraron que la exención de organización religiosa sí se aplicaba a una institución educativa fundada como institución teológica, que recibía el siete por ciento de su presupuesto anual de la convención baptista y que estaba reconocida tanto por el IRS como por el Departamento de Educación como institución educativa religiosa. EEOC v. Kamehameha Sch., 990 F.2d 458, 461-63 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 963 (1993).
...la exención de las organizaciones religiosas no puede utilizarse para justificar la contratación racialmente discriminatoria... 
Note that even when the religious organization exemption applies, it only applies to hiring and discharge, does not apply to the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment such as wages and benefits, and discrimination on the basis of any other protected characteristic is still prohibited. So, for example, the religious organization exemption cannot be used to justify engaging in racially discriminatory hiring by asserting that a tenet of its religious beliefs is to not associate with people of other races.
The ministerial exemption is not actually based on the text of the statute. Rather, it is based on the First Amendment principle that government regulation of church administration, including the appointment of clergy, impedes the free exercise of religion and constitutes “impermissible government entanglement.” Accordingly, federal courts have held that clergy members generally cannot bring claims under federal employment discrimination laws, including Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the Equal Pay Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
The ministerial exemption is much narrower than the religious organization exemption. It only applies to employees who perform essentially religious functions such as engaging in church governance, supervising religious order, or conducting religious ritual, worship, or instruction. However, the ministerial exemption does have its limits. For instance, a religious organization may not pay women less than men even if the organization’s policy is in accordance with its religious beliefs.
Over time, Congress has, among other things, broadened the definition of “religion” and added educational institutions to the list of entities eligible for the exemption. In 1978, the DOL imported Title VII’s religious exemption into its regulations implementing E.O. 11246 (see 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.5(a)(5)) and in 2002, President George W. Bush amended the underlying E.O. to expressly include Title VII’s religious exemption. Accordingly, Title VII and E.O. 11246 are closely tied with regard to providing a limited exemption from nondiscrimination provisions on religious grounds.
Recent developments in Supreme Court case law and the priorities of the current White House administration have compelled the OFCCP to propose revisions to the agency’s existing regulations regarding the scope and application of the religious exemption to align with current interpretations of Title VII. In many ways, if enacted, that is exactly what the OFCCP’s proposal would do. At the same time, however, the OFCCP’s proposal also distances the agency from federal jurisprudence where appropriate, and highlights the differences between Title VII as enforced primarily by the EEOC (and interpreted by the EEOC and the federal judiciary), and the Executive Order that is both interpreted and enforced by the OFCCP (where the agency’s determinations are rarely reviewed by the federal courts).
Recent reporting by prominent organizations have characterized the OFCCP’s proposal as being “aimed at” allowing employers to, for example, fire LGBTQ employees or unwed pregnant women on religious grounds. Such statements are a gross misrepresentation of the OFCCP’s proposal and have no basis in the proposal itself, the OFCCP’s statements about the proposal, the agency’s history of enforcing employment nondiscrimination with a religious exemption, or established case law or other interpretations.
For one thing, it is important to note that Title VII does not expressly prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. The EEOC has held that discrimination on those bases is “sex discrimination” under Title VII, but federal appellate courts are split. The 1st, 6th, 7th, 9th, and 11th Circuit Courts of Appeal have upheld the EEOC’s interpretation while the 10th Circuit disagrees (the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 8th Circuits have not weighed in). One question now before the Supreme Court is whether or not Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination on the basis of “sex” should be interpreted to include sexual orientation and/or gender identity.
If the Supreme Court decides that it does, LGBTQ employees will be protected from discrimination on the basis of “sex” under Title VII, and sex discrimination is still prohibited under the religious organization exemption. The ministerial exemption would likely allow LGBTQ discrimination in hiring and firing, but that exemption is very narrow and would not apply to the vast majority of people we tend to think of when talking about “employees.”
If the Supreme Court decides that it does not, the effect on federal contractors is less clear because here Title VII and the Executive Order diverge in an important way. Where there is no explicit LGBTQ protection in Title VII (it must be “read-in” to the statute), the Executive Order does explicitly prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, and no further interpretation is necessary. If the Supreme Court holds this way and the OFCCP is again instructed to “align” its regulations with Title VII jurisprudence, there is no aligning to be done because even though Title VII and the Executive Order are closely tied, on this particular issue they are different and the Supreme Court’s holding does not apply. Nonfederal contractor employees might not be protected from discrimination based on their LGBTQ status, but federal contractor employees would.
With regard to pregnancy discrimination, the analysis is virtually the same. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) amended Title VII to include pregnancy discrimination as constituting “sex” discrimination, and the OFCCP enforces the Executive Order accordingly. But here, there is no question regarding pregnancy discrimination before the Supreme Court that could lead to a change.
So, what would the OFCCP’s proposal actually do? On its face, not much. The OFCCP proposes to add definitions to several terms already used in existing laws and regulations such as “religion,” “particular religion,” “religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society,” “exercise of religion,” and “sincere.” By and large, these proposed definitions are taken directly from other, relevant legislation and/or established federal court jurisprudence. Some modifications are made to allow for clearer guidance and easier interpretation by largely non-lawyer agency staff, but none appear to be creating new law.
For example, the proposed definition of “religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society” does not change the criteria for determining whether or not an entity is a “religious organization” for exemption purposes. It is meant to clarify that corporations, associations, educational institutions, societies, schools, colleges, universities, and other institutions of learning can qualify as a religious organization, consistent with current law and interpretations. But they must still demonstrate that the entity was organized for a religious purpose, hold itself out to the public as carrying out a religious purpose, and exercise religion consistent with and in furtherance of a religious purpose.
The contours of the OFCCP’s definitions and potential ramifications are legitimately debatable and all should be encouraged to read the OFCCP’s proposal for themselves. It is chock full of background information and citations to relevant statutes and case law on which the agency relies. But to earmark the OFCCP’s proposal as a dramatic sea change in the religious exemption as we have known it for the past half century is, at the least, premature.
The most alarming proposal for skeptics of the agency’s intent is the paragraph the OFCCP proposes to add to its regulations establishing a rule of construction that provides for “the broadest protection of religious exercise permitted by the Constitution and laws.” That proposed provision is the result of a direct instruction from the White House reflecting current policy and priorities. Baking that policy directly into the OFCCP’s regulations would make it harder for the agency to shift, if or when the political winds change. And it is hard to say how that proposed provision would impact the agency’s enforcement policy in practical terms.
It is worth noticing, however, the number of times in the OFCCP’s proposal that the agency takes pains to note that the religious exemption has never been and still is not a license to discriminate on other bases. Often, the agency provides specific examples such as the intersection of religion and sex or race, and sends strong signals that the agency is on guard for “sham” claims of religious freedom as pretext to commit unlawful discrimination.
The largest effect of the OFCCP’s proposal could very well end up lying in the coverage of the proposal itself. The religious exemption under the Executive Order is a relatively obscure one and, according to the OFCCP, not often invoked, much less recognized. The proposal and discussions of it serve to remind federal contractor employers of its availability and could lead to a spike in organizations claiming the exemption. But written all over the OFCCP’s proposal is the agency’s intention to closely, but respectfully, scrutinize such claims and continue to methodically evaluate them as they always have.
The OFCCP’s proposal is available on the Federal Register website.
Nota del Editor: Este post fue publicado originalmente en Circaworks.com. En abril de 2023, Mitratech adquirió Circa, un proveedor líder de software de reclutamiento inclusivo y cumplimiento de OFCCP. El contenido ha sido actualizado desde entonces para reflejar nuestra oferta ampliada de productos, la evolución de las regulaciones de cumplimiento de adquisición de talento y las mejores prácticas en la gestión de RRHH.
