Lorsque les droits et libertés d'un individu ou d'un groupe d'individus entrent en conflit avec ceux d'un autre, ces intérêts doivent être mis en balance pour déterminer lequel doit prévaloir. L'équilibre entre la liberté religieuse et la non-discrimination en matière d'emploi est actuellement réexaminé et affiné par les tribunaux fédéraux et les questions sont, en un mot, compliquées.
Des informations inexactes et trompeuses ont circulé au sujet d'une récente proposition de l'Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) du ministère du travail concernant les révisions des règlements de l'agence mettant en œuvre l'Executive Order (E.O.) 11246, en particulier l'exemption religieuse de la clause de l'égalité des chances pour les entrepreneurs fédéraux. Nous avons l'intention de couper court à l'hyperbole et de fournir une vision objective de ce qui est (et n'est pas) contenu dans les révisions proposées par l'OFCCP, et de ce que ces révisions pourraient (et ne pourraient pas) signifier pour les employeurs et les employés des entrepreneurs fédéraux.
La clause d'égalité des chances en question, codifiée à 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.4, interdit aux employeurs d'entrepreneurs fédéraux détenant des contrats fédéraux admissibles de discriminer les employés ou les candidats à l'emploi sur la base de la race, de la couleur, de la religion, du sexe, de l'orientation sexuelle, de l'identité de genre ou de l'origine nationale. Cette disposition est presque identique à l'obligation de non-discrimination prévue au titre VII de la loi sur les droits civils de 1964, telle que modifiée. Comme nous le verrons, la principale différence réside dans le fait que le titre VII n'inclut pas explicitement l'orientation sexuelle ou l'identité de genre parmi les classes protégées.
Dès sa création, le titre VII a permis aux "employeurs religieux" de tenir compte de la religion pour les employés exerçant des "activités religieuses", malgré l'interdiction de tenir compte de la religion lors de la prise de décisions en matière d'emploi. En d'autres termes, dans certaines circonstances, l'intérêt d'une "organisation religieuse" pour la liberté de religion doit prévaloir sur l'intérêt de l'individu pour la non-discrimination sur la base de la religion.
Les orientations de longue date de l'Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), l'agence fédérale indépendante chargée de l'application de la loi sur les droits civils, articulent deux "types" d'exemption religieuse : l'exemption "organisation religieuse" et l'exemption "ministérielle".
Dans le cadre de l'exemption "organisation religieuse", les institutions dont "l'objectif et le caractère sont principalement religieux" sont autorisées à donner la préférence en matière d'emploi aux membres de leur propre religion. Dans ce cas, la portée de l'exemption est la plus large puisqu'elle s'applique à tous les postes, mais son application reste étroite puisqu'elle est limitée aux "organisations religieuses".
Par exemple, les tribunaux fédéraux ont estimé que l'exemption relative aux organisations religieuses ne s'appliquait pas à un fabricant d'équipements miniers qui opérait dans un but lucratif et n'était pas affilié ou soutenu par une église, même si l'entreprise épousait ouvertement une doctrine religieuse, notamment en joignant des tracts évangéliques au courrier sortant, en imprimant des versets bibliques sur ses documents commerciaux, en soutenant financièrement des organisations religieuses et en organisant un service de dévotion hebdomadaire. EEOC v. Townley Eng. & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 618 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989).
En revanche, les tribunaux fédéraux ont estimé que l'exemption relative aux organisations religieuses s'appliquait à un établissement d'enseignement fondé en tant qu'institution théologique, recevant sept pour cent de son budget annuel de la convention baptiste et reconnu à la fois par l'IRS et le ministère de l'éducation comme un établissement d'enseignement religieux. EEOC v. Kamehameha Sch., 990 F.2d 458, 461-63 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 963 (1993).
...l'exemption accordée aux organisations religieuses ne peut être utilisée pour justifier des embauches discriminatoires sur le plan racial... 
Note that even when the religious organization exemption applies, it only applies to hiring and discharge, does not apply to the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment such as wages and benefits, and discrimination on the basis of any other protected characteristic is still prohibited. So, for example, the religious organization exemption cannot be used to justify engaging in racially discriminatory hiring by asserting that a tenet of its religious beliefs is to not associate with people of other races.
The ministerial exemption is not actually based on the text of the statute. Rather, it is based on the First Amendment principle that government regulation of church administration, including the appointment of clergy, impedes the free exercise of religion and constitutes “impermissible government entanglement.” Accordingly, federal courts have held that clergy members generally cannot bring claims under federal employment discrimination laws, including Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the Equal Pay Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
The ministerial exemption is much narrower than the religious organization exemption. It only applies to employees who perform essentially religious functions such as engaging in church governance, supervising religious order, or conducting religious ritual, worship, or instruction. However, the ministerial exemption does have its limits. For instance, a religious organization may not pay women less than men even if the organization’s policy is in accordance with its religious beliefs.
Over time, Congress has, among other things, broadened the definition of “religion” and added educational institutions to the list of entities eligible for the exemption. In 1978, the DOL imported Title VII’s religious exemption into its regulations implementing E.O. 11246 (see 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.5(a)(5)) and in 2002, President George W. Bush amended the underlying E.O. to expressly include Title VII’s religious exemption. Accordingly, Title VII and E.O. 11246 are closely tied with regard to providing a limited exemption from nondiscrimination provisions on religious grounds.
Recent developments in Supreme Court case law and the priorities of the current White House administration have compelled the OFCCP to propose revisions to the agency’s existing regulations regarding the scope and application of the religious exemption to align with current interpretations of Title VII. In many ways, if enacted, that is exactly what the OFCCP’s proposal would do. At the same time, however, the OFCCP’s proposal also distances the agency from federal jurisprudence where appropriate, and highlights the differences between Title VII as enforced primarily by the EEOC (and interpreted by the EEOC and the federal judiciary), and the Executive Order that is both interpreted and enforced by the OFCCP (where the agency’s determinations are rarely reviewed by the federal courts).
Recent reporting by prominent organizations have characterized the OFCCP’s proposal as being “aimed at” allowing employers to, for example, fire LGBTQ employees or unwed pregnant women on religious grounds. Such statements are a gross misrepresentation of the OFCCP’s proposal and have no basis in the proposal itself, the OFCCP’s statements about the proposal, the agency’s history of enforcing employment nondiscrimination with a religious exemption, or established case law or other interpretations.
For one thing, it is important to note that Title VII does not expressly prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. The EEOC has held that discrimination on those bases is “sex discrimination” under Title VII, but federal appellate courts are split. The 1st, 6th, 7th, 9th, and 11th Circuit Courts of Appeal have upheld the EEOC’s interpretation while the 10th Circuit disagrees (the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 8th Circuits have not weighed in). One question now before the Supreme Court is whether or not Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination on the basis of “sex” should be interpreted to include sexual orientation and/or gender identity.
If the Supreme Court decides that it does, LGBTQ employees will be protected from discrimination on the basis of “sex” under Title VII, and sex discrimination is still prohibited under the religious organization exemption. The ministerial exemption would likely allow LGBTQ discrimination in hiring and firing, but that exemption is very narrow and would not apply to the vast majority of people we tend to think of when talking about “employees.”
If the Supreme Court decides that it does not, the effect on federal contractors is less clear because here Title VII and the Executive Order diverge in an important way. Where there is no explicit LGBTQ protection in Title VII (it must be “read-in” to the statute), the Executive Order does explicitly prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, and no further interpretation is necessary. If the Supreme Court holds this way and the OFCCP is again instructed to “align” its regulations with Title VII jurisprudence, there is no aligning to be done because even though Title VII and the Executive Order are closely tied, on this particular issue they are different and the Supreme Court’s holding does not apply. Nonfederal contractor employees might not be protected from discrimination based on their LGBTQ status, but federal contractor employees would.
With regard to pregnancy discrimination, the analysis is virtually the same. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) amended Title VII to include pregnancy discrimination as constituting “sex” discrimination, and the OFCCP enforces the Executive Order accordingly. But here, there is no question regarding pregnancy discrimination before the Supreme Court that could lead to a change.
So, what would the OFCCP’s proposal actually do? On its face, not much. The OFCCP proposes to add definitions to several terms already used in existing laws and regulations such as “religion,” “particular religion,” “religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society,” “exercise of religion,” and “sincere.” By and large, these proposed definitions are taken directly from other, relevant legislation and/or established federal court jurisprudence. Some modifications are made to allow for clearer guidance and easier interpretation by largely non-lawyer agency staff, but none appear to be creating new law.
For example, the proposed definition of “religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society” does not change the criteria for determining whether or not an entity is a “religious organization” for exemption purposes. It is meant to clarify that corporations, associations, educational institutions, societies, schools, colleges, universities, and other institutions of learning can qualify as a religious organization, consistent with current law and interpretations. But they must still demonstrate that the entity was organized for a religious purpose, hold itself out to the public as carrying out a religious purpose, and exercise religion consistent with and in furtherance of a religious purpose.
The contours of the OFCCP’s definitions and potential ramifications are legitimately debatable and all should be encouraged to read the OFCCP’s proposal for themselves. It is chock full of background information and citations to relevant statutes and case law on which the agency relies. But to earmark the OFCCP’s proposal as a dramatic sea change in the religious exemption as we have known it for the past half century is, at the least, premature.
The most alarming proposal for skeptics of the agency’s intent is the paragraph the OFCCP proposes to add to its regulations establishing a rule of construction that provides for “the broadest protection of religious exercise permitted by the Constitution and laws.” That proposed provision is the result of a direct instruction from the White House reflecting current policy and priorities. Baking that policy directly into the OFCCP’s regulations would make it harder for the agency to shift, if or when the political winds change. And it is hard to say how that proposed provision would impact the agency’s enforcement policy in practical terms.
It is worth noticing, however, the number of times in the OFCCP’s proposal that the agency takes pains to note that the religious exemption has never been and still is not a license to discriminate on other bases. Often, the agency provides specific examples such as the intersection of religion and sex or race, and sends strong signals that the agency is on guard for “sham” claims of religious freedom as pretext to commit unlawful discrimination.
The largest effect of the OFCCP’s proposal could very well end up lying in the coverage of the proposal itself. The religious exemption under the Executive Order is a relatively obscure one and, according to the OFCCP, not often invoked, much less recognized. The proposal and discussions of it serve to remind federal contractor employers of its availability and could lead to a spike in organizations claiming the exemption. But written all over the OFCCP’s proposal is the agency’s intention to closely, but respectfully, scrutinize such claims and continue to methodically evaluate them as they always have.
The OFCCP’s proposal is available on the Federal Register website.
Note de l'éditeur : Cet article a été publié à l'origine sur Circaworks.com. En avril 2023, Mitratech a acquis Circa, un fournisseur de premier plan de logiciels de recrutement inclusif et de conformité OFCCP. Le contenu a depuis été mis à jour pour refléter l'élargissement de nos offres de produits, l'évolution des réglementations de conformité en matière d'acquisition de talents et les meilleures pratiques en matière de gestion des ressources humaines.
